Eric Smith, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, stated a few days ago to US Navy officers: "We have experienced wars in Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but the next war is coming. Trust me, it is coming."
Rafael Grossi has claimed that concern about Iran achieving a nuclear weapon still exists from the perspective of IAEA inspectors and has spoken of the potential for war again. Netanyahu, whose political survival depends on the continuation of crisis and war, and who, after October 7th, shifted Israel's security and survival approach from an "inside-out" to an "outside-in" strategy, has announced he will be a candidate for the 2026 election. He claimed: "The threat from Iran has moved away from Israel, but it is not over, and now Israel's eyes are fixed on Iran."
On the other hand, Putin has assured officials of the Islamic Republic that Israel has no intention of a military attack on Iran. Trump, at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, spoke of a lasting peace in the Middle East unprecedented in thousands of years and expressed hope to reach a "stable agreement" with Iran, bringing Iran, in his words, "along with this peace."
Domestic and foreign political and international analysts also hold a dual stance. Some see war as very near and certain, while others believe war will not happen, or at least not soon. The question now is: Is war against Iran probable and imminent? To answer this question, we must address the drivers (Pishran-ha) and the inhibitors (Pesan-ha) of war. The drivers make war probable and imminent, while the inhibitors nullify or postpone it. By weighing the drivers against the inhibitors, we can estimate whether war is probable and imminent or not.
Drivers for the Outbreak of War Against Iran:
1. The primary US and Israeli strategy toward Iran before the 12-Day War was "Coercive Diplomacy; War." However, after the 12-Day War, this has shifted to "Hybrid Warfare; Coercive Diplomacy."
2. Despite US claims about the necessity of diplomacy with Iran, the refusal of US officials to negotiate—despite Iran's agreement to hold talks after the war—is an undeniable reality. Multiple pieces of evidence for this have been repeatedly raised by Iranian officials.
3. The re-imposition ("snapback") of the six Security Council resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, and the Security Council's refusal to suspend them (which implies their automatic return), provides the context and pretext for military action against Iran. This is possible by resorting to an expansive interpretation of the resolutions, despite opposition from China and Russia—just like the interpretation the US used to attack Iraq in 2003.
4. China and Russia's opposition to the snapback—made evident in the joint letter from China, Russia, and Iran to the UN Security Council yesterday regarding the expiration of Resolution 2231—strengthens Iran within the context of great power action on one hand. On the other hand, the open opposition of China and Russia to the UNSC, while they are two of the five main pillars of the UN, leads to the further weakening and inefficiency of the Council. This paves the way for arbitrary actions by the other three members against Iran and a broader interpretation of the sanctions resolution. We must not forget that the US failed to obtain authorization from the Security Council to attack Iraq in 2003; it subsequently launched a new attack and overthrew Saddam's regime by using an expansive interpretation of a 1991 UNSC resolution that had authorized the first attack.
5. Trump and many American officials have interpreted the achievement of peace in Gaza as being indebted to the military attack on Hezbollah and Iran. This discourse—that to resolve threats to Israel, Iran must be weakened and disabled—is being intensely reinforced in think tanks and political circles in the US, Europe, and Israel.
6. Israeli officials, 25 years after the 2000 withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, perceive themselves as having been liberated from the "enclosure of the Resistance Front." This was a dangerous enclosure that created unprecedented threats against Israel since its establishment and inflicted successive defeats upon it. Now, their fear of the re-formation of this enclosure by Iran has become a nightmare for Zionist officials, and they see military confrontation with Iran as the only way to counter it.
7. Israeli and US officials consider themselves victorious in the 12-Day War and believe they achieved many of their outlined objectives. This perspective has increased their audacity (temerity) to start a new war.
Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, Senior Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Responsibility for the content of this article rests with the author and does not reflect the views of the Center for Political and International Studies.)