Forty months into the Russia-Ukraine war, there is still no clear prospect for its end. In this crisis, numerous powers, including the United States, Europe, China, and Turkey, have played significant roles. However, among these nations, China has assumed a more prominent role with a calculated approach, particularly in its engagement with Russia.

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022, China maintained friendly relations with both countries and has continued to trade with both sides throughout the war. While many observers focus on the Beijing-Moscow relationship, a key point is often overlooked: despite the disruptions of the war, China has remained Ukraine's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade volume reaching nearly $8 billion in 2024.

Nevertheless, while Beijing seeks to preserve cooperation with Kyiv, Russia holds a far more significant position in China's grand foreign policy strategy.

Russia is a major nuclear power and shares a land border of over 4,200 kilometers with China. Furthermore, annual trade between China and Russia is approaching $250 billion, experiencing a threefold increase since the war began in February 2022. This trade is characterized by an imbalance: Russia primarily exports energy resources, while China exports manufactured goods. While this commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, it is significantly more critical for Russia, as it provides an outlet for its energy exports and a source for industrial goods. China, in turn, benefits from discounted resources and expands its economic influence. Additionally, the actions and rhetoric of the United States and Europe during the war have pushed China and Russia closer. Western leaders often group China and Russia together, viewing them as part of an axis, alongside Iran, that fundamentally opposes the Euro-Atlantic approach and Western global dominance.

The relationship between Moscow and Beijing in the third millennium has grown significantly, especially after the declaration of a "no-limits partnership" on February 4, 2022. This partnership, announced just three weeks before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, led to a considerable strengthening of ties in key areas. However, this cooperation faces practical limitations. These boundaries become apparent when Beijing is compelled to adapt to geopolitical developments and adopt positions different from Moscow's. Indeed, Chinese officials have attempted to offer a more moderate interpretation of this partnership. For instance, Qin Gang, then China's ambassador to the U.S., emphasized in March 2022 that the cooperation adheres to the "principles of the UN Charter and the norms of international law." Similarly, Fu Cong, China's representative to the EU, described the partnership in April 2023 as more of a "rhetorical device," stating that Beijing is not on Russia's side in the Ukraine war. Despite these interpretations, on the third anniversary of the war, Xi Jinping reaffirmed the "no-limits" partnership with Russia—an assertion made shortly after Donald Trump's attempt to mediate an end to the conflict.

Beijing has consistently sought to maintain a balance in its interactions with the parties involved. Simultaneously, there is no single unified perspective, and China's ambiguous stance on the Ukraine war over the past three years reflects this internal divergence in Beijing. This is not merely a disagreement between different intellectual camps; rather, most policymakers acknowledge the validity of both viewpoints and are reluctant to fully embrace one at the expense of the other. The 12-point statement on Ukraine, released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2023, clearly illustrates this dichotomy. The first principle of the document emphasizes respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity—a statement that supports Ukraine's defense of its territory. China has also never recognized Russia's annexation of Crimea or its claims to four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine. However, the second principle stresses that the "legitimate security concerns of all countries" must be taken seriously—a veiled endorsement of Russia's fears regarding Western pressure, including NATO expansion into what Moscow considers its backyard.

In summary, it appears that Beijing and Washington concur on an approach where Russia remains engaged in the war but does not suffer a defeat. Here, China finds itself on the same level of understanding as the United States, feeling the exact same fear: that a Russian defeat would lead to uncontrollable instability. This, indeed, is the primary fear of the world's major powers. On one hand, China's general tilt towards Russia conceals the challenges and contradictions within the Beijing-Moscow relationship. Compliance with Western financial sanctions has complicated the settlement of Sino-Russian trade. On the other hand, Western countries have repeatedly criticized China over allegations that Chinese components are used in Russian weapons, to the extent that the Ukraine issue has become a contentious topic in relations between the European continent and Beijing in recent years. Of course, China has prioritized its economic interests, especially cheap Russian energy. Meanwhile, Ukraine has also employed Chinese-made drones on a large scale and has used Chinese-made components to produce its own drones.

Ali Beman Eghbali Zarch; Head of the Eurasia Studies Group

  (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)