The recent indirect negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America regarding the nuclear issue, which are being mediated by Oman, have once again attracted the attention of the international community. Unlike in the past, when Iran primarily negotiated on nuclear matters with European countries (particularly the UK, France, and Germany, known as the E3), this round of talks is limited solely to Iran and the United States. This structural change has occurred under the influence of specific regional and international conditions, and especially due to the approach of the former United States administration.

Nevertheless, the European Troika (E3), as key actors in the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA), continue to play an important role in the diplomatic space surrounding Iran's nuclear issue and the prospects for negotiations. A review of their recent positions indicates that their approach to the current talks is a combination of concern, caution, and an effort to preserve their political influence. It seems the stances of these countries regarding the recent Iran-US nuclear negotiations are influenced by several key factors:

• Full Support for the Israeli Regime: The European Troika (E3) aligns its positions with the Israeli regime and consistently emphasizes preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israeli officials constantly strive to sensitize global public opinion to the danger of Iran obtaining a nuclear bomb and seek to turn any new agreement into a prerequisite for the complete termination of Iran's nuclear program. The E3 also attempts to highlight Israel's concerns and demands in their own positions. This approach by the E3 is rooted in their alignment with Israeli positions and their opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Consequently, these countries are intensely trying to ensure that the Iran-US nuclear negotiations proceed based on the demands of the Israeli regime and, of course, taking into account their own interests and perspectives.
• Sensitivity Regarding Marginalization from the Talks: The US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the current indirect negotiations between Iran and the US have effectively sidelined Europe's role in this process. France, in particular, is dissatisfied with this situation and insists that any future agreement must guarantee European security interests. Germany, although with a more cautious tone, supports the ongoing talks but demands that these discussions be aligned with its own interests. The United Kingdom, given its traditional closeness to US policies, attempts to play a mediating role; however, it remains concerned about the regional implications of any agreement drafted without the participation of European countries.
• Leveraging the Potential of the Snapback Mechanism and Sanctions: The E3 has repeatedly threatened to activate the snapback mechanism, which would lead to the return of UN sanctions against Iran, should European security be jeopardized or negotiations fail. This threat, particularly voiced by France, has been raised as leverage to influence the negotiation process; although it appears Europe is reluctant to activate this mechanism unless it concludes that sanctions could steer the negotiations towards their interests.
• Regional and Non-Nuclear Concerns: Despite Iranian officials consistently emphasizing that nuclear negotiations should be limited to nuclear issues, European countries, especially France and the UK, raise issues such as Iran's missile program, support for the Axis of Resistance, and the alleged military cooperation between Iran and Russia in the Ukraine war as main obstacles to improving relations with Iran. They tend to desire these issues also be raised and resolved alongside Iran's nuclear file.

Based on this, it seems that unlike in past years, when negotiating and bargaining with European countries and reaching an agreement with them was relatively easier, the situation has somewhat changed in the current period. While European countries may not view an America under Trump's leadership favorably, they are influenced by the demands of the Israeli regime, the Zionist lobby, and certainly the demands of the Iranian opposition present in their own countries, and they endeavor to adopt a tough stance towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Donald Trump, aiming to fulfill his campaign promises and project the image of a global superhero and problem-solver, intends to, at least in the current period, remove cumbersome and hindering obstacles from the path of an agreement with Iran and focus solely on preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Although the US President (referring to potential future presidency) is also significantly influenced by domestic hardliners in the US and the Zionist lobby, his self-aggrandizing and patriarchal personality simultaneously prevents opposing groups and leaders of other countries from dictating a plan for him and binding him to specific conditions.

Despite the aforementioned conditions and the unfriendly approach of European countries in recent months and weeks, the JCPOA experience shows that if influential global powers are not involved in the nuclear agreement and their interests are not secured, the agreement will not have the necessary sustainability and effectiveness in the long term. Therefore, alongside efforts being made to involve Russia and China in the current nuclear negotiations, necessary steps must also be taken to gain the support of European countries and reduce the likelihood of their obstruction in the nuclear talks. In this regard, Iran can signal its readiness for transparent dialogue and exchange of views with these countries and reduce Europe's feeling of being sidelined by strengthening diplomatic processes with them and holding direct talks with the E3, in the format of bilateral and multilateral meetings (similar to past negotiations in Geneva).

As was done in recent weeks, Iran can remove the pretext for concerns about enrichment from European countries by increasing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), especially in the areas of inspections and providing more detailed reports.

Separating nuclear from non-nuclear issues is another strategy when dealing with European countries. In negotiations with these countries, Iran should emphasize that non-nuclear issues, such as human rights matters or regional policies, should not be tied to the nuclear negotiations. It can be argued that these matters could be subject to separate negotiations and reciprocal exchanges in different areas. Pursuing this discussion can be done in a way that makes Europe feel its concerns are being addressed, without halting the nuclear talks.

Iran can also encourage European countries to support the nuclear negotiation process by offering economic incentives, including trade agreements or investments in the energy sector. The experience of the INSTEX financial mechanism, established in 2019, demonstrated Europe's interest in maintaining trade relations with Iran. However, this mechanism failed due to US pressures. Therefore, proposing the revival of a similar mechanism, with stronger guarantees to overcome external obstacles, could provide the necessary economic motivation for Europe's cooperation and participation.

Another important step in this regard is effective engagement with public opinion in Europe. This is particularly crucial given that the Iranian opposition abroad and their affiliated media have painted a negative and bleak picture of Iran in the international community, especially in Europe. In response to this situation, Iran's diplomatic apparatus must seriously utilize public diplomacy tools to improve the country's image on the global and European stage. Actions such as publishing articles and interviews by Iranian officials in reputable European media, organizing joint cultural and scientific events, and inviting European journalists to visit Iran can be effective in reducing misunderstandings and presenting a more realistic image.

In conclusion, while in some instances reciprocal action against the unfriendly stances of European countries (especially the UK, France, and Germany) seems necessary, it must be acknowledged that these countries play a sensitive role in the eventual outcome of the Iran-US nuclear negotiations. Therefore, maintaining coordination with all parties relevant to the 2015 agreement, including these three countries, is vital and beneficial.

To pave the way for the formation of a strong and effective nuclear agreement in the current period, Iran should endeavor to gain the cooperation of these countries and prevent their potential obstruction by adopting active diplomacy, clarifying its approaches, strengthening economic ties, and prudently separating nuclear from non-nuclear issues. Along this path, striking a balance between safeguarding national interests and pride on the one hand, and creating an atmosphere of trust with Europe on the other, is crucial.

Success in this approach will not only help advance the nuclear negotiations but can also lead to strengthening Iran's position in the international system.

 Mohammad Mehdi Mazaheri, University Professor

   (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)