"Habit" is a mental phenomenon that arises from the formation of a complex network of neural networks in the human mind. Just as the body's nervous system adapts to temperature changes (hot and cold) over time, similarly, in the interactions of neural networks, mental habits are formed, evoking a kind of "extension of the past and present into the future" in the mind. This phenomenon aligns with Alexander Wendt's constructivist theory, which emphasizes the pivotal role of mental habits in interpreting reality. Despite the important role of habits in daily life, mental habits can be detrimental for decision-makers because these habits reduce the sensitivity of the decision-maker's mind to sudden and unexpected events. In other words, mental habits cause the decision-maker's mind to focus more on current trends and patterns than on potential and unforeseen events in the future.

The importance of this theoretical introduction lies in the fact that political decision-makers in Iran have increasingly faced unexpected and surprising events in recent years, both domestically and internationally. A brief look at domestic developments and especially regional developments in recent years shows that policymaking in Iran has largely leaned towards being "event-driven." This event-driven approach has made predicting future developments difficult and has also weakened ongoing trends, creating a suitable environment for surprising and even catastrophic events in society. In such circumstances, the mental inclination towards "habit" and reliance on the "extension of the past and present into the future" provides an easy path for the decision-maker; whereas, with the fading of trends and the emergence of sudden events, the decision-maker's mind must be prepared to face various scenarios and plan for every possible event through scenario-based thinking. To better understand this, one only needs to look at the surprising developments in the region over the past two years. Mental habits might have conceived of such developments occurring over a ten-year period; however, reality followed a different path, and events that were expected to occur over a decade based on mental habits and previous trends took place within a 10 to 20-month timeframe. These developments include: the October 7th operation, the Israeli regime's attack on Gaza, the escalation of this regime's conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria, the helicopter crash of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran's military response to the Zionist regime during Operation True Promise. These developments show that relying solely on mental habits and ignoring the possibility of unexpected events can lead to surprise and the adoption of inappropriate decisions.

The occurrence of this volume of impactful events in a timeframe of less than two years bolsters the likelihood that surprising and even catastrophic events, which decision-makers consider unlikely due to the prevalence of their mental habits, will occur in the near future and force themselves upon policymakers. Therefore, it is predicted that the next year will also witness significant developments, among the most probable of which is the occurrence of a war between the US and Israel against Iran; a catastrophic war against Iranian military installations, for which serious signs and analyses regarding its potential occurrence also exist.

In contrast, mental habits might dismiss such a war, citing Trump's transactional approach and his reluctance to initiate wars, especially at the beginning of his presidency. This perspective holds that Trump seeks to force Iran into negotiations by increasing sanctions, and that military threats are simply leverage to impose a unilateral agreement. However, reality often does not follow expectations based on mental habits. A meticulous examination of the existing indicators suggests that the possibility of a surprise military attack by the US and Israel on Iran should be considered a serious and probable scenario. Currently, there are signs and nascent phenomena that strengthen the likelihood of an attack on Iran, while at the same time, other signs and nascent phenomena are observed that weaken the likelihood of such an attack in the short term.

What Signs Strengthen a Military Attack on Iran in the Short Term?

1. Israel's and America's perception of the power structure and the shifting balance of power in the Middle East after October 7th.
2. America's and Israel's perception of Iran's military power in response to a potential attack on Iranian military installations.
3. America's and Israel's perception of the reciprocal relationship between the Iranian government and the Iranian people.
4. America's and Israel's perception of the enrichment threshold in Iran.
5. America's and Israel's belief in the sharp decrease of Iran's strategic depth in the region, especially the Levant.
6. Trump's 2025 "either negotiation or war" approach instead of Trump's 2018 "either negotiation or sanctions" approach.
7. Intense lobbying by Zionists (especially Netanyahu's caretaker government, which sees its survival in the continuation of war) in the White House to encourage Trump to wage war against Iran.
8. Europe's harsh stances towards Iran and the discourse of advocating for a limited war against Iran from the UK.
9. France's and the UK's full and unprecedented support for Israel during Operation True Promise.
10. The possibility of Iran becoming a bargaining chip in exchange for a Ukraine agreement.

What Signs Weaken a Military Attack on Iran in the Short Term?

1. Fear of the war becoming endless.
2. Fear of the war spilling over to areas surrounding Iran.
3. Iran's decisive military response and attack on American and Israeli bases on a large scale.
4. China's and Russia's opposition to military action against Iran.
5. The potential opposition of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the war.
6. Iran's reluctance to enter into a direct war with the United States.
7. Iran's pragmatism when the crisis intensifies.

A look at the aforementioned signs shows that the signs strengthening war are more numerous and more conducive to war than the signs weakening it. Therefore, political decision-makers in Iran should consider a military attack by the US and Israel in the short term to be very probable and serious.

Seyed Mohammad Hosseini, Senior Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies.

  (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)