Can an agreement between Iran and the US be predicted in Trump's second term?

The confrontation between Iran and the US has intensified in recent years, and it is predicted that with the start of the Trump administration, this confrontation will reach a "critical crisis" point. Many analysts believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran should no longer confront the Trump administration with the "neither direct negotiation nor war" model that it had chosen to deal with US pressures during the Biden era, but should prepare itself with the "both negotiation and war" model (including hybrid warfare and direct and indirect military warfare). Naturally, reaching an honorable agreement is the most rational and least costly way to manage the existing tension between Iran and the US, especially since increasing tension with the Trump administration will bring about the intensification of sanctions and the possibility of war. But an honorable agreement with the US, and in contrast, increasing tension and war with the US, has drivers at the national level of Iran, at the national level of the US, at the regional level and at the level of the international system, and evaluating each of those drivers can give us a perspective on the agreement or conflict between Iran and the US during the Trump era. In this note, we will examine the drivers of agreement and conflict with the US at the national level of Iran, and in subsequent notes, we will study the subsequent levels.

Within Iran, the drivers that make an agreement possible are:

1- Pragmatism in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been inherent in the context of Iran's foreign policy over the past 45 years, and whenever the preservation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which from the point of view of Imam Khomeini (ra) is the most obligatory of obligations, has required it, pragmatic decisions have been made. Therefore, the characteristic of pragmatism in Iran's foreign policy is a driver for reaching an agreement.

2- The approach of Mr. Pezeshkian's government is also to reach an honorable agreement, since Mr. Pezeshkian in his election campaigns spoke of the necessity of interacting with the world and considered it possible to reach an agreement with the US to lift the oppressive sanctions against Iran. Mr. Araghchi has also repeatedly spoken of the concept of "managing conflict with the US," from which this statement, the tendency of the diplomatic apparatus to negotiate with the US can be interpreted.

3- The pressures resulting from the oppressive US sanctions against Iran, which like a global network has inevitably aligned even Iran's friendly neighbors with the US, is another driver for the necessity of an agreement with the US. It is no secret that the JCPOA agreement brought relative stability and economic growth for Iran, and immediately after Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, a decrease in economic growth, a decline in the value of the national currency and unprecedented inflation, gripped the Iranian economy. With the coming to power of Biden's government, openings were achieved for the Iranian economy, which was a combination of Iranian diplomacy and Biden's desire to control the nuclear program and control tensions with Iran. Trump in recent months has repeatedly criticized Biden's policy towards Iran and said that Biden's policy caused the injection of 150 billion dollars into the Iranian economy. He has strongly defended his sanctions policy against Iran and has promised to intensify sanctions against Iran. Increasing sanctions against Iran is the least costly strategy for Trump. A strategy that Trump believes has worked. Therefore, the concern about the increase of sanctions by Trump is also considered a driver for agreement with the US at the national level.

4- Reformists in Iran as a political force that has supporters at the societal level and has a great deal of influence in society through the media, are also considered a driver for agreement. The decline in participation in the recent elections and also the election of Mr. Pezeshkian has given the reformists in Iranian society a double power to raise their demand for de-escalation with the US more than ever before.

On the other hand; there are four drivers that not only create problems for an agreement with the US, but also cause increased tension and even conflict and war with the US, and include the following:

1- Historical perception of the US, which has a negative history among politicians and the public aware of history. Iranians, for reasons such as the 1953 coup, the negative intervention of the US in the imposed war, the attack on the Iranian passenger plane, placing Iran in the axis of evil, and especially the US's breach of commitment in the JCPOA, etc., do not trust the US.

2- Anti-Americanism as a manifestation of anti-arrogance has become an identity-defining element in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is difficult to abandon.

3- Some political currents that have maneuvering power in major decision-making are also a serious obstacle to negotiations with the US, each of which has its own motives and reasons for not negotiating with the US.

4- The difficult and negative experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the JCPOA agreement and the US's breach of commitment and Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA makes the work for an agreement with the Trump administration more difficult.

If we place the drivers encouraging agreement and the drivers preventing agreement against each other, we observe that the will of the Pezeshkian government and the desire of the reformist forces to advance an agreement with the US face serious obstacles, meaning that historical perceptions, the identity of anti-Americanism, anti-American political currents and the negative experience of the JCPOA each pull the brake of these two drivers in some way, but on the other hand, Iran's pragmatism in foreign policy and also the issue of additional pressures resulting from sanctions can, by overcoming the four obstacles, provide the grounds for an agreement with the US in Trump's second term.

 Seyed Mohammad Hosseini, Senior Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies

  (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)