The neighborhood policy is a process that starts with the will of the governments, but it continues with the action of non-governmental actors, and its fruit is harvested when mutual trust has been established between the governments. From this point of view, the neighborhood policy is like a locomotive that must start from a certain point. The central core wants to extend to other neighbors. An initial model wants other neighbors to adopt the neighborhood strategy inspired by its usefulness. If this successful model creates, inspires, and promotes the neighborhood policy, then we can also hope for an endogenous regional order that will gradually be created and replaced by an exogenous regional order that is built by the will and intervention of foreign powers.

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, especially in recent years, has chosen the neighborhood strategy with the two goals of starting the process of endogenous regionalism and managing US sanctions as the priority of its foreign policy, Iraq is the most favorable option for modeling and starting the neighborhood policy. Why Iraq?

1. Iraq, in regional fronts, especially in the confrontation and conflict between the resistance front and the Western-Arab front, tries to adopt a policy of neutrality. However, it is inclined to the resistance front in declaration positions and to the Western-Arab front in practical policies.
2. What makes the neighborhood relations between Iran and Iraq prone to modeling above all is the deep relations at the level of the two nations. The deep relations between the Kurds, Arabs, and Shiites of Iran and Iraq are very strong drivers for further deepening the relations of non-state actors who bear the main burden of neighborhood policy.
3. The role of Qom and Najaf authority (Marja'iat) in the convergence of the two nations is an irreplaceable support in the region for the realization of the neighborhood policy of the two countries. The unified body of the Popular Mobilization (Basij) Forces of Iran and Iraq in confronting ISIS was the product of guidance and the will of the institution of Marja'iat.
4. Iran, among the countries of the region, has a relative technical, engineering, economic, and commercial advantage to participate in Iraq's reconstruction process.
5. The political will of the Iraqi government and Kurdistan region government to develop neighborhood relations with Iran is stronger than that of other neighbors.

Despite all this, the advancement of Iran and Iraq's neighborhood policy also has obstacles; the biggest obstacle is US sanctions against Iran, so the technical, commercial, and banking exchanges between Iran and Iraq have faced a serious challenge. The Iraqi government has considerations about commercial and banking cooperation with Iran. Firstly, they don't want to enter into confrontation with America by cooperating with Iran, and secondly, Iraq's crossing of the red line of US sanctions prevents them from participating in the Global Value Chain (GVC). The painful fact is that the current commercial and banking cooperation of the Iraqi government with Iran is also done with the approval of the US Department of the Treasury. Therefore, whenever the US decides, probably the same level of commercial and banking exchanges will also be stopped or will be fundamentally challenged.

During his recent visit to Iraq, Mr. Dr. Pezeshkian learned about the obstacles to expanding neighborhood relations between Iran and Iraq. Realism and their trust in expert opinion have revived the hope that he accepts the facts in foreign policy, although some of the facts of Iran's foreign policy are flawed.

In the past, Iran has gone through two experiences in foreign policy that it should learn from. In the 11th government, the starting point of Iran's foreign policy was the dialogue with the Western powers. Our problems were supposed to be resolved with the Western bloc rather than our regional problems, including the neighborhood policy be easily resolved. We saw that not only did this not happen, but contrary to the expectations, our regional rivals played an important role in provoking Trump and withdrawing America from the JCPOA in 2017. In the second experience, the 13th government set its starting point as the neighborhood policy and looking to the east, hoping that by ignoring the hostility of the US, it could introduce a new plan in Iran's foreign relations, but in practice, it should be seen that behind any agreement with its neighbors and even Chinese government, the shadow of American sanctions is over Iran and creates a difficult obstacle.

Mr. Pezeshkian and Mr. Araghchi, by criticizing both past procedures, intend to derive a synthesis from the past two practices and simultaneously follow the neighborhood policy and dialogue with the West to manage and remove sanctions. This strategy is generally very commendable and intelligent, but what road map can these two strategies be drawn on in complementary coordinates is a big question facing Iran's foreign policy experts.

Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, a senior expert at the Institute for Political and International Studies

(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)