In the first place, it must be taken into account that geopolitical values in every region are based on various criteria and inevitably get different priorities. An understanding of the axial geopolitical impact and having effective reserves in geopolitics is based on a new classification considering the course of changes at the international level and rivalry in new multilateralism.
Today, Argentina’s geopolitical position does not follow traditional norms of significance, as the country has maintained a series of approaches and seeks to gain new tools to boost its bargaining power. Changes in the governments have always had a major role in the definition of Argentina’s geopolitical value. While Argentina has always tried to maintain its role in ensuring food security in the world through connection with international companies, it has never been able to use such an opportunity to define the course of cooperation with the cooperative, target, and like-minded countries. Even Argentina’s membership in the regional organizations, such as MERCOSUR, has failed to turn into geopolitical or geo-economic effectiveness in the challenge of domestic competition and has not created any new advantages in the shape of limited geopolitical superiority either.
From a political viewpoint, the election of the new leftist moderate government of Fernandez and the defeat of Macri's neoliberal government has changed some of Argentina’s foreign policy approaches to critical issues such as Venezuela and Bolivia, interaction with Brazil’s right-wing government, and fresh efforts to launch close cooperation with Mexico. Such a shift could affect Latin America’s internal geopolitical viewpoint. Considering the ideology, attitude, method, and function of Macri's right-wing government, the contemporary geopolitical model of Argentina has practically moved into a transition period at present. On the other hand, Argentina’s stances on the process of rivalry in new multilateralism, the extent of historical alignment with the US government, the debts to the International Monetary Fund, and the foreign lobbies’ influence on the imposition of political processes have all pushed the extent of control over a true definition of geopolitical interests and the ability to impose them into an internal contest and caution. Obviously, the ability to have options in the geopolitical games and smart flexibility requires a level of preparedness at the national level and execution of resolve in geopolitics. Considering that the role of history lacks any advantage in Argentina’s geopolitical equation, the combination of such conditions has put compulsory restrictions on the maximum use of geopolitical influence on the region.
Nevertheless, such situations and conditions do not spell the ineffectiveness of Argentina’s place in the equations. In proportion to the changes, Argentina has always tried to employ its capability to improve the geopolitical goals as a younger brother in Brazil. In the current conditions, the government of Fernandez in Argentina is pursuing the policy of limited interaction and competition in the region with an eye to maintaining economic ties with Brazil and providing spiritual support for the socialist opposition.
The Argentinian strategists have been also monitoring the geopolitical rivalry among big powers such as China, Russia, the European Union, and the US, as well as actors like Iran and the Zionist regime, in finding friends in Latin America. They have usually formulated plans to play with the alignments and opportunities proportional to the policies of Argentina’s central government. Generally, the Latin American countries’ ability to develop initiatives for the creation of geopolitical stability in Latin America is deemed to be low, and this is not confined to Argentina alone. Argentina is probably known as the most European nation in Latin America. With strong human resources, Argentina is capable of presenting its definitions independently to the world with clear Argentinian words and descriptions.
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)