The long awaited and highly controversial Afghan peace agreement was finally signed on 29th Feb. 2020 in Doha, Qatar. The so called “comprehensive peace agreement” focuses on four key issues of; preventing the use of the soil of Afghanistan against the security of the US and its allies, announcement of timeline for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, resumption of intra-Afghan talks on 10 March 2020 with the permanent and comprehensive cease fire on its agenda. Commitment on the part of the US to withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan in line with a 14- month timetable, and also the agreement to release 5000 Taliban and 1000 Afghan government prisoners prior to resumption of Intra-Afghan dialogue are the highlights of the peace accord.
The peace understanding while prioritizing the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan comes short of effectively and clearly addressing key issues of the ceasefire, the Intra-Afghan Dialogue and the role of the present Afghan Government as vital elements of a lasting peace in the war-ravaged country. The Fate of these critical points are left to be decided in due course and under unforeseen circumstances to the benefit of Taliban movement with time at its side. The only part of the peace agreement fully implemented so far is the withdrawal of the United States and other NATO member state forces from Afghanistan. In line with its undertakings, the United States has reduced the number of its troops from 13000 to 8600 and withdrew from 5 military bases ahead of the agreed 135-day schedule. With the planned departure of 4100 more US troops in Fall this year, the number shall touch the 4500 low which inevitably compromise the quality of the support operations extended to Afghan National army in combating the Taliban advances as the United Sates is no longer engaged in direct offensive operation against Taliban. Taliban too, since conclusion of the peace deal has so far refrained from targeting US forces and instead did intensify assaults on Afghan Government forces and bombings of mainly civilian targets.
The disagreement between the Afghan Government and the US administration on the nature and content of the peace agreement, most notably the release of Taliban prisoners as the precursor to the intra-afghan talks, together with the prolonged efforts to resolve the Ghani - Abdullah electoral impasse delayed further implementation of the peace agreement. So far Kabul authorities have released 4600 Taliban prisoners but President Ghani declined to order the release the remaining 400 deeming them “too dangerous” and instead decided to refer the issue to the gathering of Afghan elders, the “Loya Jirga’. On the other hand, the Taliban has claimed that it had already released all the 1000 government prisoners whereas the government insists that those freed are ordinary citizens and not the national army and security personnel still held by Taliban. As such, and in the absence of a complete prisoner swap, the Taliban is not obliged to return to the negotiating table.
It may be recalled that the creation of the Taliban movement in 1994 and the subsequent establishment of its “Islamic Emirates” in 1996 enjoyed the undeniable blessing of the United States, and despite the presence of the internationally recognized government of President Rabbani, Washington permitted Taliban to establish its unofficial representation in the States which was active until the ouster of Taliban from power in 2001.
The Clinton administration while criticizing Taliban’s ideological rule and its harsh treatment of the local population saw the presence of a relatively stable setup enjoying close ties with Pakistan and at the same time, locked at a strategic and ideological conflict with the neighboring Iran in full conformity with its regional policy and thus, did not consider the Taliban dominated Afghanistan a great deviation from its regional designs and overall interests. However, the ensuing events such as the open arms of Taliban for Al-Qaeda and other non- Afghan Jihadi groups as guests of the Afghan people and non-compliance of Mulla Omar to the US demands for eviction and surrendering of Al-Qaeda operatives following the September 11th 2001 event brought to an end the US-Taliban interaction and marked the beginning of the longest overseas military engagement of America.
During the 19 years of United State’s strong military presence in Afghanistan and the all-out efforts to uproot the Taliban, this movement continued to survive with an ever growing trend of armed struggle and has succeeded in controlling large portions of the country proving self to be a decisive player not to be ignored in any peace making effort. Also the unsatisfactory current state of affairs in Afghanistan and lack of an encouraging prospect for the present Kabul establishment to face the real challenges threatening its survival without relying on direct American support, has left the United states with very limited options including coming into terms with the reality of the stage and to terminate its unsuccessful venture with the least possible repercussions.
America’s declared initial objectives drawn for its military invasion of Afghanistan were to wipe out all sanctuaries of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups which it succeeded to a great extent, and also to help transform the country into a modern nation-state powerful enough to extend its authority throughout the country leaving less chances for international terrorism to find safe heaven there once again.
From the view point of American policy makers Taliban aside from total domination of Afghanistan and departure of all foreign military forces has not claimed any global or supra-national goals and contrary to groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda does not, at least openly, considers self duty-bound to wage struggles aimed at formation of an Islamic state beyond the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan. It might appear to them that Taliban has learnt valuable lessons from its fatal mistake of interaction with Al-Qaeda and likeminded terrorist cells and does not see much benefit in tolerating the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan which by any definition should be considered as an adversary seeking more areas under its command and influence.
As such, despite Washington’s failure to help sustain a strong and responsive administration of its choosing in Kabul, the more valuable asset of ensuring an Afghanistan less prone to the presence of the International terrorism (as projected by American policy makers) would be within reach through a final settlement with their yesterday’s foe, the Taliban. What comes next, in terms of the fate of Afghan nation, the civil society, the already functioning democratic institutions and power sharing pledges by Taliban are all secondary issues overshadowed by the political benefits of troop withdrawal so desired by President Donald Trump.
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)