The Transition from the Old Order to the New Through the Gateway of the Ukraine War
Russias largest aerial assault since the beginning of the Ukraine war took place on September 7th targeting the main cabinet building of the Ukrainian government in Kyiv which houses the cabinet of ministers and their offices.
Russia's largest aerial assault since the beginning of the Ukraine war took place on September 7th, targeting the main cabinet building of the Ukrainian government in Kyiv, which houses the cabinet of ministers and their offices.
Over the past year, the Trump administration, whose country has played a pivotal role in prolonging the Ukraine war, has initiated relentless new efforts to establish a ceasefire and an agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, these efforts have so far been met with the maximalist demands of Vladimir Putin.
Meanwhile, the United States' demands regarding the Ukraine war have decreased, while Russia's have increased; yet, there are still no signs of a new ceasefire between the two countries.
The war in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has now become a complex, ambiguous, and uncertain issue with multiple actors playing a role. A review of the past 52 months since the war's inception presents two major questions for international relations analysts:
1. In an era where wars are planned to be short and scheduled, why has the Ukraine war turned into a war of attrition?
2. While Russia anticipated ending the war within two weeks and had planned for a short conflict, why is it now unwilling to agree to a ceasefire after 52 months?
In response to the first question, it must be said that the Ukraine war has become a key component in the intensification of bloc formation in the international system and the transition from the old order to a new international order. The United States, Europe, Russia, and China are the main actors shaping this new bloc formation and, ultimately, the future international order. The outcome of the Ukraine war will be highly decisive in the configuration of this future order. Stephen Walt, a proponent of defensive realism, has described the Ukraine war as the end of the US-centric unipolar order. In an article published in Foreign Policy in 2022, Walt argued that this war marks the end of America's unipolar moment and returns the world to a state best explained by realism. Walt wrote in that article:
Whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, many observers believe it will have a profound impact on the broader landscape of world politics. A major fork in the road. If Russia suffers a major defeat, the liberal world order will be revitalized... With a possible Russian victory, global norms against territorial acquisition by force will be weakened, and others will likely feel empowered to launch similar campaigns whenever the geopolitical situation aligns in their favor. I (Walt) see the story differently. The war in Ukraine is a momentous event, but not because its outcome will have a dramatic independent effect on the global balance of power or the normative environment that states have constructed. It is significant, rather, because it marks the definitive end of the unipolar moment, where the United States was the world's sole true superpower. The unipolar moment was never going to last forever, but its premature demise has been hastened by glaring errors for which no one has ever been held accountable. What is different about the current war, however, is that for the first time since the early 1990s—but not for the first time in history—rival great powers are on opposite sides of a major conflict. This is a return to the familiar patterns of great-power conflict (and proxy wars), not something new or unique.
Before the start of the Ukraine war, Realist theorists believed that the United States needed to form a regional coalition in Asia and even cooperate with Russia to contain China's growing power. However, the Ukraine war derailed this strategic effort:
1. It shifted the US focus away from East Asia (the primary center of tension with Beijing).
2. It completely separated Russia from the Western camp and pushed it closer to China.
In the meantime, China adopted a smart policy regarding the Ukraine war. While remaining faithful to its pre-war friendship with Moscow, Beijing used the crisis to capitalize on the inevitable decline of the American unipolar system. The deepening of relations with Russia after the war, simultaneous with a lack of direct involvement in the conflict, took place within the framework of China's effort to engineer the re-blocking of the international system.
China's dream is to create an alternative world order to the Western liberal system—an order in which China holds a significant stake and emerges as a new pole in the international system.
Both Xi Jinping and Putin want the world to be divided into spheres of influence among several great powers: China dominating East Asia, Russia maintaining a veto over the security of all of Europe, and the United States being restricted to Western Europe and its trans-Atlantic backyard.
The answer to the first question (why the war became one of attrition) also facilitates the answer to the second (why Russia won't agree to a ceasefire). Russia was unintentionally dragged into a war of attrition that it hadn't planned for.
One result of this war of attrition has been the reduction of Russian influence in other regions, including the Caucasus and the Middle East. This led to consequences like the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, and the increased influence of rivals such as Turkey and Israel in the power vacuum created by Russia in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the US and Turkish influence in the Caucasus, manifested in the agreement to establish the Zangezur Corridor, was also a result of Russia's diminished standing in the region.
However, Russia's most significant cost has been the organized sanctions imposed by the Western bloc, which have severely reduced Russia's share in the global trade network and confronted the country with mounting economic crises.
Now, the logic of survival in the anarchic structure of the international system and the transitional period from the old to the new order dictates that Putin must make full use of his existing security and political leverage in the international system. The war with Ukraine is Russia's only arena to preserve its global standing and negotiate with the West. The Russian economy has moved past the initial shock of the sanctions and is adapting to them; some experts believe the Russian economy has become accustomed to sanctions.
On the other hand, Russia's leverage in the Mediterranean and the Caucasus has been constrained, and it has largely ceded the strategic fields of the Mediterranean and the Caucasus to its rivals. The Ukraine war is Putin's final front for claiming a stake in the future international order and securing a position within the great power bloc formation.
Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, Senior Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)