<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">The contemporary Middle East cannot be explained through twentieth-century identity concepts. Transnational projects that once claimed to define the "Arab world" have now given way to the strict logic of the nation-state and security competition. In this context, the idea formulated by Fawaz Ajami, former dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a figure close to American neoconservatives, in his late 1980s article in Foreign Affairs titled "The End of Pan-Arabism," is now not merely a historical interpretation, but an analytical framework for understanding the current regional situation—a situation in which Arab identity no longer has the capacity to organize regional politics, having been replaced by a scattered network of security-oriented states.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Ajami argued that the Pan-Arab project—as an attempt to create a unified political and identity structure in the Arab world—had suffered structural erosion and eventual decline due to internal contradictions among Arab states, the precedence of survival logic over transnational solidarity, and the failure to establish sustainable institutions. He demonstrated that following the political and military defeats of the 1960s, particularly the 1967 war, the Arab world gradually moved away from unitarian logic toward state-nation nationalism and intra-regional competition, such that "Pan-Arabism" ended not suddenly, but as a protracted historical project.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Pan-Arabism in the twentieth century, especially during the Nasserist era, was an attempt to transcend state borders and create a unified political-identity entity in the Arab world. This project was based on the assumption of shared political and cultural destiny in the Arab world, but in practice, it faced three structural limitations: competition among emerging Arab states, the precedence of survival logic over solidarity logic, and the inability to build sustainable transnational institutions. Military and political defeats, especially in the 1960s, accelerated this erosive process, gradually steering Arab states toward prioritizing national interests and regime security.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">In the current situation, this erosion has reached a point where one can speak of "Post-Pan-Arabism." The Arab world is neither a coherent political bloc nor even an identity space with the capacity for collective mobilization. What remains is a collection of states that, despite shared language and culture, are engaged in deep geopolitical competition. New fissures are no longer just Arab versus non-Arab; the Arab world itself has become multi-layered and pluralistic: Gulf competitions, fissures stemming from internal crises, and the simultaneous convergence of temporary alignments with external powers.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">In this context, the regional order has shifted from an ideological logic to a state-centric logic. Regime security, survival, and the balance of power have replaced unitarian projects. Regional cooperation is now formed not on the basis of shared identity, but based on tactical necessities and common threats. This situation has transformed the Middle East into a space where alliances are fluid, temporary, and multi-layered.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">In this context, the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Post-Pan-Arabist order requires independent analysis. Iran was fundamentally defined outside the Pan-Arabist logic and has operated from the outset within the framework of a non-Arab political identity and an independent strategy. In the vacuum created by the decline of Arab convergence, Iran has been able to create a network of security, political, and informal relations in parts of the region, which in some cases has led to a form of "networked influence." However, this position comes with structural limitations, including resistance from Arab states, intense competition with other regional powers, and the difficulty of converting informal influence into a stable order.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">At the macro level, what is observed in the Middle East today is neither the formation of a new hegemony nor a return to ideological blocs. Rather, we are facing a non-polar, multi-layered order in which several regional powers—including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Zionist regime—are engaged in continuous balancing. This balance is neither moving toward consolidation nor toward total collapse, but exists in a state of permanent suspension.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">An important feature of this order is that regional actors are simultaneously engaged in competition and cooperation. This contradictory coexistence is the product of the absence of a dominant identity or security center. Unlike periods when a transnational ideology could organize the regional order, no dominant discourse is currently capable of creating sustainable cohesion. Internationally, this situation has become more complex. Major powers act not as determining hegemons, but as intervening players in a scattered field. The result is an intensification of fluidity in alliances and a reduction in predictability in regional politics.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, it can be argued that the end of Pan-Arabism is not merely the end of an ideology, but the beginning of a new structural status quo in the Middle East. In this status quo, regional politics is organized around survival, balance, and the management of uncertainty, rather than unity or ideology. This transformation demands a new analytical framework in which the nation-state is considered not as a transitional unit, but as the dominant and stable form of power organization in the region.</p> <p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Sajjad Atazadeh, Expert at the Center for Political and International Studies</p> <p dir="ltr"><b><i> (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)</i></b></p>