Strategic warning for the 14th government: preventing Iran from irrelevance

As I mentioned before the start of the campaigns of the esteemed presidential candidates in a note titled transformation or evolution in foreign policy the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should be the underlying and pre-winner of the major principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic included in the upstream laws and documents by an evolutionary approach. Specifically

As I mentioned before the start of the campaigns of the esteemed presidential candidates, in a note titled transformation or evolution in foreign policy, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should be the underlying and pre-winner of the major principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic included in the upstream laws and documents by an evolutionary approach. Specifically, the diplomatic system of the 14th government should be the underlying for the actions of governmental and non-governmental institutions that want to take a step forward in the field of security, economy, culture, and environment in line with the implementation of the roadmap that the Supreme Leader announced in the general policies related to the diplomatic system of the country. A deep transformation is not supposed to be created with aspirational-to-nowhere plans. Still, these short but continuous steps in 10 years will create a gradual and positive transformation and change.

One of the hidden threats that is directed at the country's national interests and will gradually reveal its destructive effects is the process of irrelevance of Iran in the regional and global political economy. A process that has been started for some time, and its destructive effects will gradually appear. Suppose proper planning and measures are not taken against this destructive process. In that case, the existential security of the country will face serious risks in the not-too-distant future.

But what is irrelevance, and what are its characteristics? Irrelevance is a process during which a person, organization, or country is perceptually transformed into a problem in the minds of others, and interacting with it is considered costly in the cost-utilitarian rationality and gradually leaves the circle of communication.  Observing the approach of different countries to the Islamic Republic of Iran shows that Iran has gradually become a problem in the prevailing discourse in the international system and the region, and it has entered the process of irrelevance in the perception of countries, even by friendly countries; how? An analysis of the foreign policy discourse of different governments in different regions of the international system shows:

• From America's point of view, Iran is a contradictory state;
• From Europe's point of view, Iran is the state that confronts the nation and disturbs the world order;
• From China's point of view, Iran is a state with limited cooperation;
• From Russia's point of view, Iran is a state with the possibility of tactical cooperation with the aim of bargaining with the West;
• From an East Asian country's point of view, Iran is a disturbing state.'
• From the point of view of the effective actors of the Middle East, Iran is a threatening state and a competitor with negative power.

A definite conclusion can be drawn from these approaches, including:

Iran has become a problem for many countries and even friendly countries. Becoming a problem means entering the channel of irrelevance. Suppose no action is taken to become irrelevant. In that case, it will end in the being others in the international and regional system. Being others in the international system definitely has risks for that country.

Now we can see some signs of the irrelevance process of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and the international system:

1. OPEC has managed the reduction of Iran's oil supply with self-regulation mechanisms, and even the complete elimination of Iran in oil production and supply does not pose a fundamental challenge to this organization.
2. Sanction regimes against Iran's economy and trade have caused Iran's participation in the regional and global trade network to face a fundamental challenge.
3. Sanction regimes against Iran have caused even friendly and neighboring countries to face fundamental challenges in trade and economic exchanges with Iran.
4. Iran's problems in the security and political fields have prevented foreign investment in Iran and even caused domestic capital to flee from Iran. This will gradually cause the country's lack of development and a gap with the countries in the region.
5. The gradual exclusion of Iran from important international corridors (passing through ring roads instead of passing through Iran) has caused the stagnation of Iranian seaports such as Bandar Abbas and Chabahar.
6. The psychological war against Iran as an actor disturbing the peace in the Middle East has strengthened the problem of Iran in the perception of countries.
7. The project of Iran's perceptual link to Russia in the Ukraine war has strengthened the perception of Iran as a belligerent actor.
8. The transition of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf from a survival-oriented strategy to a development-oriented strategy increases the perceived distinction of Iran from other countries in the region. It makes Iran an exception in the Middle East.
9. Iran's double energy in the international environment (combating America) and the Syrian environment (combating the Zionist regime) decreases the possibility of Iran's effective action in the AF-PAK environment, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia, and unintentionally helps the irrelevance process of Iran in these environments.
10. Finally, the anti-act to deal with irrelevance is the politics and security subject to economic imperatives. In Iran, however, the economy is a circle on the edge of the big circle of politics and security.

Therefore, the big problem of the 14th government's foreign policy is to identify the signs of irrelevance and plan and measure to create anti-act processes.

Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, a senior expert at the IPIS

 (The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)