Possible Arrangements for Nuclear Verification under the Future Treaty
The primary purpose to establish a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is to ensure the total absence of these weapons in the region. It is in conformity with the Article VII of the NPT. This achievement while increase security and stability in this region will also provide a good basis for sustainable socio-economic as well as cultural and scientific growth and development in each and every member and the region as a whole.
The primary purpose to establish a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is to ensure the total absence of these weapons in the region. It is in conformity with the Article VII of the NPT. This achievement while increase security and stability in this region, will also provide a good basis for sustainable socio-economic as well as cultural and scientific growth and development in each and every member and the region as a whole.
A treaty to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is of utmost importance and requires to follow a holistic and comprehensive approach in its formulation. Such a treaty will have various aspects, including security, political, economic, and international cooperation dimensions. Therefore, all these dimensions should be properly considered while drafting and negotiating the Treaty. Although it is perceived that the obligation of countries based on international law and their commitment to the principle pacta sunt servanda obliges them to respect the treaty they have accepted, and it is also possible that with utilizing other measures such as cooperation, transparency and Trustbuilding and stable and constant communication between the members, to reduce misunderstandings regarding the implementation of the provisions of the treaty, but experience has proven that treaties in the field of disarmament and arms control should be effective and strengthened through a well-defined verification mechanism.
Historically, the monitoring of the implementation of these treaties has had an evolutionary process, and the evolved mechanisms of inspection and verification have become more important every day. Many examples can be cited in this regard. For example, some very important treaties on the prohibition and destruction of weapons of mass destruction, such as the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, lack a defined verification and inspection mechanism. International efforts to strengthen this treaty and add an effective protocol to it in 1990s tragically failed due to the rejection of a major power. On the contrary, a look at the verification and inspection mechanism provided for the 1992 Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons shows very well what qualitative and important evolution has taken place in this field.
Therefore, the new treaty that is supposed to create a zone free of nuclear weapon and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East will not be disconnected from this experience, but rather it should use these previous accumulated experiences. For this purpose, several issues should be considered together:
The new treaty is interconnected to existing international treaties in the field of disarmament. Therefore, the universality of existing instruments such as the NPT, CWC, BWS, the IAEA safeguards, etc, and adherence of all members of the Middle East to them is crucially important to realize a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. In the absence of the universality of these tools, any effort to ensure total absence of weapons of mass destruction and to establish confidence and stability in the region is not possible.
The new treaty should require countries to apply international supervision and safeguards to their facilities and related activities as non-nuclear weapon states. Currently, the greatest challenge in the Middle East is the existence of illegal Israeli facilities and activities, which are suspected of spreading weapons of mass destruction.
As its title suggests, the Middle East region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has a major difference from other similar regions in the world. This treaty is supposed to go several steps further and ensure the absence of other weapons of mass destruction in this region in addition to the nuclear weapon free zone. Therefore, the verification mechanism of this treaty will be more complicated. This treaty will utilize an array of technologies and techniques that have been used in several treaties and will combine them in a functional system. Issues such as transparency and confidence building, safeguarding, monitoring, verification mechanism and probably inspection technics, which are used in three areas related to the limitation and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, are also required in this single treaty. Also, the executive arrangements of each of these branches will be needed in the implementation of the new treaty.
Verification is a sophisticated process to make a judgment about compliance or non-compliance with an agreement. The aim of a verification regime is to increase confidence that a treaty is being implemented fairly and effectively. An effective verification and compliance regime, could serve the purpose of having states comply with their obligations and minimize the related risks to the lowest possible level. The compliance mechanisms also need to be compelling as possible, providing a high degree of assurance that any violation will be dealt with firmly and effectively.
An array of procedures, techniques and technologies of monitoring, safeguarding and verification has already been identified and developed by the international community. In the framework of the IAEA and the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons a set of sophisticated and advanced safeguarding and verification developed which is the most pertinent to this subject. The IAEA’s experience in operating nuclear safeguards does offer some insights into prospects for sustaining a verification regime. In recent history particularly from the 1990s since the cold war ended, a shift in multilateral verification culture has emerged, marked by the acceptance of increased levels of mutual transparency and intrusiveness. Mutual assurances of compliance among parties is now involve detailed reporting of information, sophisticated analysis of the information, the use of the latest monitoring technologies and methods and more intrusive kinds of inspections. International instruments that demonstrate this phenomenon include the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Additional Protocol for strengthened safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The best practice of such verification regimes will certainly be required to be employed for a NWFZ in the Middle East.
Many other regions already established a Nuclear Free Zone. Their experience would be useful in making the verification regime of the NWFZ in the Middle East. As an example I refer to the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The experience of Latin America and the Caribbean Nuclear Weapon Free Zone may have many lessons for a similar case to follow. Tlatelolco Treaty established a verification regime that based on multilateral or bilateral agreements with the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards to nuclear activities of States Parties to the treaty is applied. In addition it created the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) to ensure that the obligations of the treaty are met. Other arrangements of the treaty including those to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territory of concerned states, as well as the obligation of all NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty, could also be helpful in the process of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East.
A verification regime for NWFZ in the Middle East, while needs to be effective and sophisticated enough, should be in a way to avoid impediment to the peaceful nuclear activities of the parties and not to interfere the military and industrial activities outside the purpose of such an instrument. This issue has always been a matter of concern by the states parties to the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. In safeguards agreements of the IAEA, the Additional protocol and the CWC, procedures and practices established mechanisms and procedures to minimize this problem as much as it is possible. Those procedures and practices must be applied in the NWFZ in the Middle East. It is also the case in protection of the security, commercial, economic information of the State parties. Any intrusive verification regime is potentially susceptible to discovering and leaking those information which might be crucial for the parties. Those events would jeopardize the environment of cooperation of the authorities and the agencies within the receiving states with the inspectors.
An important part of the implementation of the commitments by the members of the zone depends on the cooperation of the industrial section. States need to provide solid ground for the cooperation of the industrial section. At the same time the implementation of the commitments would not impede the normal activities of the industry. It requires multilateral obligations as well as domestic legislations. Many issues are involved in this process such as a fair balance between the implementation of the instrument and providing guarantee to the normal activities of the firms and companies. Implementation of the instrument should no imped the routine functions or cause barrier to the activities of the firms and companies.
The confidentiality policy of the perceived treaty must be as strong as possible to protect the interest of the States parties and the operating organization/s simultaneously. Disclosure of those information must be subject to appropriate penalty. A precise and workable confidentiality policy needs to be carefully defined and in a balanced manner so as to enabling the implementation of the obligations and to protect the confidential information of members, whether to be the confidential information related to their national security information or their industrial or commercial activities.
At the same time managed access techniques to protect commercial and security related information are already commonplace procedures.
Research about how to improve procedures and technics to more effectively protect information need to be continued.
Prohibition of any physical or cyber-attack or any other kind of threat against nuclear facilities must be an undertaking under the instrument. Emphasizing that such attacks or threats to attack will have incalculable, unforeseen human sufferings and environmental destructive consequences, there would be essential to set obligations on their prohibition.
In case of creating a regional arrangement (organization, agency, etc) its deferent organs including the area of their function and responsibilities need to be elaborated. For instance the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat, each may have particular responsibilities to be defined by the members.
In addition to these regional mechanisms, national mechanisms should also be established or strengthened. The efficiency and effectiveness of national authorities in the implementation of the treaty is very important. National authorities are an important part of an efficient system that can strike a balance between fulfilling obligations and securing the interests of members.
For the correct implementation of the system, it is important to employ qualified and experienced staff. Wider representation of governments in the implementation of regional and international treaties is a recognized practice. It is not against the need to hire professional and qualified people. At the same time training is clearly important in maintaining and improving the skills of the staff. It is the case for both staff at the organization as well as the operators at the national authorities of the member states.
Conclusion
Establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, requires a verification regime to guarantee its effective implementation. The verification while to be strong and effective enough to guarantee the full compliance of the members , needs to be in a manner not to impede or jeopardize normal activities of the parties or interfere other peaceful activities not related to the subject matter or to compromise the confidential and crucial security and commercial information of the parties.
Mohammad Taghi Hosseini, Vice-President of the IPIS for Education and Training
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)