Dimensions and Consequences of UK’s Withdrawal from the EU
The United Kingdom (UK) formally left the European Union institutions on 30 January 2020 after three years of tough negotiations with various EU officials, ending 47 years of membership.
The United Kingdom (UK) formally left the European Union institutions on 30 January 2020 after three years of tough negotiations with various EU officials, ending 47 years of membership.
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union was the biggest change in the country’s domestic and foreign policy over the past 50 years. The British society has become bipolar in domestic terms, which could beset the UK for years. From the foreign policy perspective, the UK has not still found its new shape after leaving the EU. Accordingly, it will try to remain as an influential power in Europe’s foreign policy. The UK’s foreign policy before Brexit was based upon three pillars: trans-Atlanticism, European leadership, and multilateralism. The UK used to act as a bridge between the US and Europe. But withdrawal from the EU will weaken multilateralism, and the UK can no more carry on with the policy of alignment with the US and influence on the European stances. After leaving the European Union, the UK will be trying to align itself with the US in the foreign policy, security and economic arenas, and at the same time to maintain relations with Europe within the framework of its interests. Therefore, the UK has called for reinforcement of NATO and greater access to US markets.
As a non-member of the EU in Europe, the UK has to make new agreements on the future of its ties with the European Union. It also has to open a representative office in Brussels, send an envoy, and allow the European Union to open an office in London.
The number of the European Parliament seats will shrink from 751 to 705 as the UK leaves the EU. Of the 73 seats in the European Parliament freed up by the departure of the UK, 27 seats will be re-distributed among the other EU countries, while 46 others will be removed.
Brexit may also affect the UK’s stances on the JCPOA and will possibly draw the UK away from cooperation with Europe and bring it closer to American president Donald Trump’s policies. Although the UK officials are still putting emphasis on alignment with Europe in their formal remarks, the realistic necessities of Brexit could drive the UK further away from Brussels.
What is clear is that Brexit will adversely affect the political sphere of Europe and will contribute to retreat from the European Union. Accordingly, Brussels has offered London a hard Brexit option in order to cushion its possible domino effects. Brexit will also have negative impacts on the domestic developments and the political, economic, security, defense, financial and energy affairs in Europe, and on the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.
However, it must be taken into account that although the UK has left the EU, it still needs to preserve ties with Europe as a European country to expand its global influence. In other words, the UK needs a new definition of its position in Europe and of the trans-Atlantic relations after Brexit.
A group of experts of international affairs believe the era of permanent alliances is over, and the temporary alliances are going to replace the permanent ones in future. In other words, the big powers would form an alliance with a number of aligned countries with common interests in order to achieve their political, military and economic objectives, but the alliance will expire as soon as the objectives are accomplished. Brexit can be regarded as a good litmus test for such perception of the future of regional and global order.
Without the UK, the European Union will be smaller and geopolitically weaker. The EU’s international influences will also diminish. In other words, the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union has been a lose-lose situation for both sides. Should Europe fail to find an appropriate replacement for the UK as a new EU member, the situation in Europe in 2020 will be different from 2019.
(The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IPIS)